Building PSSM Capacity in the Greater Sahel

By the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) 

The physical security of weapons and ammunition stockpiles is essential to prevent the diversion of state weapons stocks from legal to illicit markets, particularly in areas where non-state armed groups are active. Effective stockpile management is also necessary to reduce the risk of unplanned explosions triggered by improper storage, and the associated risks to human life and nearby infrastructure. In the Greater Sahel region, where non-state armed groups often cross borders with impunity, and where a recent influx of small arms from Libya has contributed to a growing market for arms, the need for sound Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM) is particularly stark.

To address this challenge, in early 2015 the German Federal Foreign Office, the African Union Defense and Security Division (AU-DSD), and the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) began a project to improve PSSM practices across the Greater Sahel. This AU-Germany project is based on the premise that even seemingly small PSSM measures, including regulations for locks, the use of ID badges to restrict access, and proper accounting procedures can help to reduce the risk of diversion from government stocks. In this respect, the project is in line with Sustainable Development Goal Target 16.4, which aims to significantly reduce illicit arms flows by 2030. With Target 16.4 in mind, in October 2015 the project partners established a PSSM Coordination Platform, which annually brings together regional organizations, AU member states, relevant implementing agencies and donors. The Coordination Platform is designed to:

• Promote the sustainability of PSSM support provided by donors and implementing agencies.
• Contribute to the effective transfer of PSSM expertise between Coordination Platform members. 
• Facilitate operational and technical cooperation on PSSM among AU member states. 

The first meeting of the Coordination Platform was held on 11 June 2016, and addressed the possible creation of an AU roster of PSSM experts. This proposal was further discussed at an AU-Germany PSSM Technical Working Group (PSSM-TWG) meeting on 12-13 October 2016. During this PSSM-TWG meeting, the international agencies in attendance acknowledged that current PSSM interventions do not always allow for the sustainable transfer of PSSM skills to national counterparts. This admission was attributed to the fact that donor investment in PSSM training is often one-time only, rather than longer-term. In response, the AU-DSD and BICC agreed to map existing PSSM capacity across the Greater Sahel, and to provide repeated PSSM training to a small number of pre-selected individuals. The overall idea behind this endeavour is to ensure that the African Union has a group of highly trained PSSM experts at its disposal, from Greater Sahel nations, who can be deployed when the AU receives requests for technical assistance. These rostered individuals will also be used to train others across the region in PSSM.

The Coordination Platform and PSSM-TWG meetings also exposed the need for increased guidance on how to secure and manage arms and ammunition in contexts of resource scarcity. To address this need, the AU-DSD and BICC will produce two Operational Guidance Notes (OGNs) and associated training modules throughout 2017. The first of these Guidance Notes will provide information on the incremental steps that can be taken towards improved PSSM in instances where resources are limited and the IATGs and ISACS are difficult to implement in full. The second OGN will address ways to improve the sustainability of PSSM projects by outlining the necessary preconditions for successful PSSM and measures to secure improved national ownership. As currently planned, both documents will be used to train individuals selected for the aforementioned AU PSSM roster. Links to both the roster and the two OGNs will also be made available on a new AU website, dedicated to PSSM, which is scheduled to be online early next year.

The overall progress of the AU-Germany project will be measured in terms of the number of individuals identified and trained for the AU PSSM roster, and the number of deployments undertaken by rostered personnel. While these deployments will initially be limited to the Greater Sahel region, the roster may later be scaled-up to the continental level. First results from the project will be presented at the second annual meeting of the Coordination Platform, scheduled for mid-2017.

The Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) is a Germany-based think tank dealing with global topics in the field of peace and conflict research, including the (de)mobilization of violent actors, global migration, and the use of natural resources. BICC’s research both lays the foundation for policy advice and contributes to the public debate.

Measuring illicit arms flows in Honduras

Photo: Matthias Novak

By Matthias Nowak

The Honduran customs authorities recently reported a spectacular increase in the number of firearms seized at the country’s borders. On average, customs officials seized 35–40 weapons per month in 2016, compared to just 2.5 firearms per month five years earlier. Beyond the numbers, what does this rise in seized firearms tell us about the evolution of illicit arms flows in Honduras?

UN member states are committed to reducing illicit arms flows under Target 16.4 of the Sustainable Development Goals. Although proposals to monitor this commitment focus on arms seizures, variations in the quantities of arms seized in any location do not necessarily reflect actual changes in illicit arms flows. As a recent Small Arms Survey Research Note on monitoring illicit arms flows in Honduras explains, these variations can instead be the result of, among other things, changes in the number of law enforcement personnel, the availability of the resources at their disposal, or enforcement policy.

Moreover, in addition to cross-border trafficking, illicit arms flows take many different forms in Honduras. These include firearms that are purchased from local illicit markets, that are diverted from the legal holdings of security agencies, and that are lost by or stolen from private individuals. In fact, interviewed Honduran police officials estimate that among the firearms they seize in the context of administrative violations, minor offences, and crime scenes, up to 40 per cent were legally registered in the country at some point.

In short, seizures of firearms at the country’s borders are only one part of the picture—and one that is difficult to interpret. Their reported increase may result from a rise in cross-border arms flows, or from more dedicated efforts by customs and border control authorities, or a combination of both. A focus on border seizures also risks missing the important role played by domestically sourced firearms in trafficking and crime.

So what additional information would be required to better keep track of and measure illicit arms flows in Honduras? If data is to help determine new trends and identify patterns in illicit arms flows in the country, the information needs to reflect the seizures made by all the relevant agencies, not just those that focus on cross-border trafficking. It should also be disaggregated by weapon type, model, and the precise circumstances of each seizure. Furthermore, it is essential to be able to keep track of the proportions of the various types of weapons seized over time, because the appearance of unusual firearms models in the data will often point to changing trafficking patterns.

Finally, seizure data can be meaningfully triangulated through the monitoring of a series of complementary indicators. In the case of Honduras, the Survey has concluded that time-series data on prices for illicit firearms and ammunition in the country has the potential to reveal important trends in their accessibility. Moreover, the significant decrease in violent deaths observed in Honduras since 2011 hints at the possible effectiveness of the authorities’ efforts to reduce illicit arms flows and armed violence, so firearms homicide statistics could be a further indicator of the accessibility of firearms. Putting in place systematic data collection mechanisms that include a combination of such indicators promises a more nuanced and policy-relevant monitoring of illicit arms flows in Honduras.



Matthias Nowak is a researcher at the Small Arms Survey. His work focuses on measuring the effects of lethal violence, and how small arms and light weapons impact security and development in both conflict and non-conflict contexts. Recent fieldwork undertaken in Central America and Western Africa focuses on counter-proliferation and preventing and reducing the illicit use of small arms and light weapons.

Maritime Arms Seizures Point to Iran

Photo: Royal Australian Navy

By N.R. Jenzen-Jones, Armament Research Services (ARES)


US, Australian, and French naval forces operating in the northern Indian Ocean have seized thousands of small arms and light weapons in 2016. Whilst initial reports indicated the first two seizures were heading for Somalia, the types of weapons recovered suggest that the vessels almost certainly originated from Iran, and were likely destined for Yemen. More recent US Navy statements support this analysis.

On 27 February 2016, sailors from the Royal Australian Navy ship HMAS Darwin (FFG 04) boarded a fishing vessel to conduct a flag verification visit. They proceeded to uncover an arsenal of weapons, including nearly 2,000 AK type self-loading rifles, 100 RPG-7 type shoulder-fired recoilless weapons, 49 PKM type general-purpose machine guns, and 20 60 mm mortar tubes. On 20 March 2016, sailors from the French Navy ship FS Provence (D652) boarded another unflagged fishing vessel, and seized several hundred AK type self-loading rifles, as well as general-purpose machine guns, 64 SVD type designated marksman rifles, and nine unspecified anti-tank guided weapons.

In both cases, initial reports from the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) indicated that the vessels were destined for Somalia, and that the weapons were seized under UN sanctions authorizing the interdiction on the high seas of illicit arms and munitions destined for Somalia. In both cases, the vessels were determined to be stateless. The crew was of ‘various nationalities’.

In both seizures, the recovered weapons strongly suggest that the vessels were likely to have originated in Iran—both ships were transporting North Korean-made Type 73 general-purpose machine guns (GPMG), an uncommon weapon, produced only by DPRK. Iran is the only known importer of this machine gun.

Armament Research Services (ARES) has been tracking the proliferation of the Type 73, and has documented their use in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. In Syria, the weapon has been seen in the hands of the Syrian Arab Army and pro-Assad Shi’a militias, whilst in Iraq it has been observed in service with various Iraqi Shi’a militias, including those associated with the Badr Brigade, a group which receives substantial support—both material and financial—from Iran and which has operated under the direct command of Iranian forces in Iraq. Other Iraqi groups have also acquired limited numbers of the Type 73, including the al-Imam Ali Brigade and the Christian Babylon Brigades.

The Type 73 GPMG has also made its way to Iranian-supported Houthi forces in Yemen. Recent videos from 14 and 27 March aired by the Houthi-operated Al-Masirah channel show the Type 73 in the hands of Houthi fighters in governorates of Taiz and Al Jawf.

The common denominator linking the presence of these weapons in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen is likely to be Iran. Sometime in the late 1970s or early 1980s, Iran received the only known exports of the Type 73 GPMG from North Korea. Iran made use of these weapons during the Iran-Iraq War and has continued to employ the Type 73 in a reserve role with the paramilitary Basij forces. In recent years, several of the weapons have been spotted in videos of Basij military exercises.

On 28 March 2016, sailors from the USS Sirocco boarded a third stateless dhow, this time seizing some 1,500 AK type self-loading rifles, 200 RPG-7 type shoulder-fired recoilless weapons, and 21 DShKM type heavy machine guns. As with the earlier seizures, this shipment contained visually distinctive items that point to Iran, including Iranian-style RPG-7 type launchers. These weapons feature a distinctive olive green heat shield and pistol grip, and often incorporate yellow factory markings and a round supporting grip that are unique to Iranian and Sudanese production.

Other seizures of Iranian-made weapons aboard fishing vessels off the coast of Oman have also been reported. In September last year, CMF forces from an unspecified Gulf nation seized a number of Iranian-made anti-tank guided weapons and other materiel aboard an unflagged vessel. The US Navy later indicated that the dhow may have been bound for Somalia.

The inconspicuous fishing dhow has long been considered a key tool in smuggling operations operated by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards in the Persian Gulf. The lack of registry and modern navigation aids is commonplace amongst small fishing vessels in the Indian Ocean, and the swarms of similar craft give cover to pirates and drug smugglers, as well as the illicit transfer of arms and munitions.

It is possible that the weapons in question may have been headed to Somalia for local or secondary sale, but it’s more likely that they were destined for Yemen, either directly or via Somalia as an intermediate port. In previous cases, illicit Iranian arms were shipped through neutral ports and hidden amongst the clutter of maritime traffic. Regardless of their destination, it is highly likely that these illicit shipments originated in Iran.

N.R Jenzen-Jones is a military arms and munitions specialist and security analyst who focuses on current and recent conflicts. He is the Small Arms Survey's technical specialist and director of Armament Research Services (ARES), a specialist technical intelligence consultancy.

Disclaimer: This post was originally published on the Hoplite and is reproduced courtesy of Armament Research Services (ARES).

Somalia and the challenge of illicit arms flows

The Small Arms Survey recently released the first of four Issue Briefs exploring the dynamics of illicit weapons flows. This study—on the situation in South Central Somalia—discusses possible methods to reduce illicit arms flows and points to some of the metrics that can be used to measure progress towards this end.

To put it mildly, the proliferation of illicit weapons in Somalia is a major problem that goes beyond the steady flow of illicit weapons entering through the country’s airstrips and seaports. Last month, on 11 October, a Reuters news story ran the headline, ‘Exclusive: UN-approved Weapons Imports Resold in Somalia’—and this wasn’t the first time that weapons had been reported surreptitiously disappearing from government supplies, either. Reuters ran a story two years earlier with nearly the same headline when it reported on Somali government weapons being transferred to allied clan-militias in violation of the UN arms embargo. In the latter case, some of these weapons were retransferred to al-Shabaab fighters; defending government troops against their own weapons is certainly not an arrangement that the Federal Government of Somalia would like to see continue.

There is a long way to go in Somalia to stop illicit arms trafficking, on the one hand, and leakage from government weapons supplies, on the other. It is reasonable to assume that reducing government leakage (or at least monitoring the government’s loss of its own weapons) is easier to do than preventing illicit transfers between non-state actors—particularly when most of these transfers happen in areas outside government control. But even so, the marking and record keeping of government weapons—a fundamental prerequisite to enable their tracing when they are lost (or deliberately leaked)—remains incomplete and, hence, inadequate. So with this as a backdrop, the improvement of government accountability measures and the strengthening of its weapons security procedures will be likely topics during the upcoming UN Security Council’s review of its 2013 arms embargo exemptions for Somalia. These exemptions—which were met with some resistance from other states when the Security Council first considered them—allow weapons to be exported to the Somali government in an effort to bolster its capacity to fight against a resilient and maleficent al-Shabaab. It stands to reason, therefore, that the government will need to demonstrate how it intends to increase its efforts to strengthen its weapons and ammunition management procedures beyond their current state.

Due to the work of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group—the UN-mandated mechanism to oversee and report on the implementation of the Somalia arms embargo provisions—a great deal is known about both how illicit weapons are trafficked into Somalia and the points where state-held arms supplies are diverted. But ultimately, as the Survey’s recently released Issue Brief emphasizes, more systematic collection of data on illicit weapons types and quantities is needed to better understand the factors behind their proliferation. If the Somali government is to navigate its way to a more peaceful future (or at least one where stronger measures are in place to combat illicit weapons), accurate data on illicit arms flows is needed, including types and firearms’ individual markings. Obtaining this kind of data requires a commitment from the Federal Government of Somalia to tighten its control over its own weapons supplies and domestic transfer procedures. Doing so will have the added benefit of contributing to efforts to monitor and reduce illicit arms flows, in line with Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) Target 16.4.

Interested in contributing to the discussion? Here are the guidelines for blog posts

The Global Partnership on Small Arms is a platform where stakeholders engaged in reducing or preventing illicit arms trafficking can interact. Our goal is for the community to have a place to exchange information, experience, knowledge, and offer feedback to one another in order to further our shared goals .

The platform also includes this blog. The blog is a place where partners––practitioners, experts, diplomats, or staffers––can provide share information on items of mutual interest, highlight recent publications or projects, or otherwise engage the community on relevant topics. For example, a partner might blog about situations where the proliferation of illicit arms fostered armed violence or share experiences on an effective small arms control intervention. Blog posts could also promote the policy-relevant findings of a recent publication or highlight a topical event, process, or even a news story.

Ideally, the blog posts will be 600 words or less. We encourage the use of visuals (though our platform is limited to 2 per post). We also encourage contributors to be concise, write accessibly, and be as reader-friendly as possible. As you can see, the tone of a blog post is intended to be less formal than published outputs but we ask that all posts be referenced appropriately and follow a clear and logical structure. We also ask that contributors propose five keywords (maximum of 5), highligthing the main themes of the piece. Those keywords will appear above the post and will be used these to allow readers to access similar content.

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Welcome to the 'Talking Target 16.4' blog

This  blog is meant to be a support to the implementation of target SDG16.4 ("By 2030, significantly reduce illicit arms flows"). It offers the possibility to those engaged in reducing or preventing illicit arms trafficking to interact; exchange information, experience, and knowledge; and give feedback to further their shared goals. 


In principle, we would discuss relevant issues on a monthly base.