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Monday, November 28, 2016

Maritime Arms Seizures Point to Iran


Photo: Royal Australian Navy











By N.R. Jenzen-Jones, Armament Research Services (ARES)


US, Australian, and French naval forces operating in the northern Indian Ocean have seized thousands of small arms and light weapons in 2016. Whilst initial reports indicated the first two seizures were heading for Somalia, the types of weapons recovered suggest that the vessels almost certainly originated from Iran, and were likely destined for Yemen. More recent US Navy statements support this analysis.

On 27 February 2016, sailors from the Royal Australian Navy ship HMAS Darwin (FFG 04) boarded a fishing vessel to conduct a flag verification visit. They proceeded to uncover an arsenal of weapons, including nearly 2,000 AK type self-loading rifles, 100 RPG-7 type shoulder-fired recoilless weapons, 49 PKM type general-purpose machine guns, and 20 60 mm mortar tubes. On 20 March 2016, sailors from the French Navy ship FS Provence (D652) boarded another unflagged fishing vessel, and seized several hundred AK type self-loading rifles, as well as general-purpose machine guns, 64 SVD type designated marksman rifles, and nine unspecified anti-tank guided weapons.

In both cases, initial reports from the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) indicated that the vessels were destined for Somalia, and that the weapons were seized under UN sanctions authorizing the interdiction on the high seas of illicit arms and munitions destined for Somalia. In both cases, the vessels were determined to be stateless. The crew was of ‘various nationalities’.

In both seizures, the recovered weapons strongly suggest that the vessels were likely to have originated in Iran—both ships were transporting North Korean-made Type 73 general-purpose machine guns (GPMG), an uncommon weapon, produced only by DPRK. Iran is the only known importer of this machine gun.

Armament Research Services (ARES) has been tracking the proliferation of the Type 73, and has documented their use in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. In Syria, the weapon has been seen in the hands of the Syrian Arab Army and pro-Assad Shi’a militias, whilst in Iraq it has been observed in service with various Iraqi Shi’a militias, including those associated with the Badr Brigade, a group which receives substantial support—both material and financial—from Iran and which has operated under the direct command of Iranian forces in Iraq. Other Iraqi groups have also acquired limited numbers of the Type 73, including the al-Imam Ali Brigade and the Christian Babylon Brigades.

The Type 73 GPMG has also made its way to Iranian-supported Houthi forces in Yemen. Recent videos from 14 and 27 March aired by the Houthi-operated Al-Masirah channel show the Type 73 in the hands of Houthi fighters in governorates of Taiz and Al Jawf.

The common denominator linking the presence of these weapons in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen is likely to be Iran. Sometime in the late 1970s or early 1980s, Iran received the only known exports of the Type 73 GPMG from North Korea. Iran made use of these weapons during the Iran-Iraq War and has continued to employ the Type 73 in a reserve role with the paramilitary Basij forces. In recent years, several of the weapons have been spotted in videos of Basij military exercises.

On 28 March 2016, sailors from the USS Sirocco boarded a third stateless dhow, this time seizing some 1,500 AK type self-loading rifles, 200 RPG-7 type shoulder-fired recoilless weapons, and 21 DShKM type heavy machine guns. As with the earlier seizures, this shipment contained visually distinctive items that point to Iran, including Iranian-style RPG-7 type launchers. These weapons feature a distinctive olive green heat shield and pistol grip, and often incorporate yellow factory markings and a round supporting grip that are unique to Iranian and Sudanese production.

Other seizures of Iranian-made weapons aboard fishing vessels off the coast of Oman have also been reported. In September last year, CMF forces from an unspecified Gulf nation seized a number of Iranian-made anti-tank guided weapons and other materiel aboard an unflagged vessel. The US Navy later indicated that the dhow may have been bound for Somalia.

The inconspicuous fishing dhow has long been considered a key tool in smuggling operations operated by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards in the Persian Gulf. The lack of registry and modern navigation aids is commonplace amongst small fishing vessels in the Indian Ocean, and the swarms of similar craft give cover to pirates and drug smugglers, as well as the illicit transfer of arms and munitions.

It is possible that the weapons in question may have been headed to Somalia for local or secondary sale, but it’s more likely that they were destined for Yemen, either directly or via Somalia as an intermediate port. In previous cases, illicit Iranian arms were shipped through neutral ports and hidden amongst the clutter of maritime traffic. Regardless of their destination, it is highly likely that these illicit shipments originated in Iran.



N.R Jenzen-Jones is a military arms and munitions specialist and security analyst who focuses on current and recent conflicts. He is the Small Arms Survey's technical specialist and director of Armament Research Services (ARES), a specialist technical intelligence consultancy.

Disclaimer: This post was originally published on the Hoplite and is reproduced courtesy of Armament Research Services (ARES).




Thursday, November 3, 2016

Somalia and the challenge of illicit arms flows


The Small Arms Survey recently released the first of four Issue Briefs exploring the dynamics of illicit weapons flows. This study—on the situation in South Central Somalia—discusses possible methods to reduce illicit arms flows and points to some of the metrics that can be used to measure progress towards this end.

To put it mildly, the proliferation of illicit weapons in Somalia is a major problem that goes beyond the steady flow of illicit weapons entering through the country’s airstrips and seaports. Last month, on 11 October, a Reuters news story ran the headline, ‘Exclusive: UN-approved Weapons Imports Resold in Somalia’—and this wasn’t the first time that weapons had been reported surreptitiously disappearing from government supplies, either. Reuters ran a story two years earlier with nearly the same headline when it reported on Somali government weapons being transferred to allied clan-militias in violation of the UN arms embargo. In the latter case, some of these weapons were retransferred to al-Shabaab fighters; defending government troops against their own weapons is certainly not an arrangement that the Federal Government of Somalia would like to see continue.

There is a long way to go in Somalia to stop illicit arms trafficking, on the one hand, and leakage from government weapons supplies, on the other. It is reasonable to assume that reducing government leakage (or at least monitoring the government’s loss of its own weapons) is easier to do than preventing illicit transfers between non-state actors—particularly when most of these transfers happen in areas outside government control. But even so, the marking and record keeping of government weapons—a fundamental prerequisite to enable their tracing when they are lost (or deliberately leaked)—remains incomplete and, hence, inadequate. So with this as a backdrop, the improvement of government accountability measures and the strengthening of its weapons security procedures will be likely topics during the upcoming UN Security Council’s review of its 2013 arms embargo exemptions for Somalia. These exemptions—which were met with some resistance from other states when the Security Council first considered them—allow weapons to be exported to the Somali government in an effort to bolster its capacity to fight against a resilient and maleficent al-Shabaab. It stands to reason, therefore, that the government will need to demonstrate how it intends to increase its efforts to strengthen its weapons and ammunition management procedures beyond their current state.

Due to the work of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group—the UN-mandated mechanism to oversee and report on the implementation of the Somalia arms embargo provisions—a great deal is known about both how illicit weapons are trafficked into Somalia and the points where state-held arms supplies are diverted. But ultimately, as the Survey’s recently released Issue Brief emphasizes, more systematic collection of data on illicit weapons types and quantities is needed to better understand the factors behind their proliferation. If the Somali government is to navigate its way to a more peaceful future (or at least one where stronger measures are in place to combat illicit weapons), accurate data on illicit arms flows is needed, including types and firearms’ individual markings. Obtaining this kind of data requires a commitment from the Federal Government of Somalia to tighten its control over its own weapons supplies and domestic transfer procedures. Doing so will have the added benefit of contributing to efforts to monitor and reduce illicit arms flows, in line with Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) Target 16.4.